Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place:
The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"
: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:
: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain
: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power.
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success